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AFTER “TOP GUN”:  HOW DRONE STRIKES IMPACT THE 
LAW OF WAR 
LAURIE R. BLANK* 
“We have just won a war with a lot of heroes flying around in 
planes.  The next war may be fought by airplanes with no men in 
them at all . . . . Take everything you‟ve learned about aviation in 
war, throw it out the window, and let‟s go to work on tomorrow‟s 
aviation.  It will be different from anything the world has ever 
seen.” 
 — General Henry H. ―Hap‖ Arnold 
 
In 2010, the United States launched 118 drone strikes in 
Pakistan, an exponential increase over past years.1  In a broader 
view, in 2009, the U.S. Army reported a 400% increase in drone 
flight hours over the previous ten years.2  Drones are regularly 
used in combat operations in Afghanistan3 and Libya,4 and have 
 
* Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory University School 
of Law. 
1 See 2011: The Year of the Drone, NEW AM. FOUND., 
http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones/2011 (noting a total of nine U.S. 
drone strikes in Pakistan from 2004–2007, compared to seventy such strikes in 
2011). 
2 See J.D. Leipold, Army to Increase Medevac Support, Add New CAB, More 
UAVs, WWW.ARMY.MIL, Jan. 7, 2010, available at http://www.army.mil 
/article/32603/ (discussing the military‘s efforts to increase armed 
reconnaissance capabilities). 
3 See, e.g., Christopher Drew, For Spying and Attacks, Drones Play a Growing 
Role in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2010, at A6 (discussing the expansion of 
the use of drones in Afghanistan). 
4 See, e.g., Martha Raddatz, Pentagon Confirms First Predator Drone Strike in 
Libya, ABCNEWS.COM, Apr. 23, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/International 
/pentagon-confirms-predator-drone-strike-libya/story?id=13442570 (confirming 
a U.S. drone strike against Qadhafi‘s forces in Libya as the first U.S. drone strike 
in that country). 
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been used to launch targeted killings in Somalia5 and Yemen.6  The 
most widely reported drone strike in 2011 was the killing of Anwar 
al-Awlaki in Yemen on September 30, 2011.7  Although 
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities make drones a 
workhorse of modern intelligence gathering and targeting 
determinations, public discourse and outcry have focused on the 
so-called ―robots in the sky‖8 that launch aerial attacks on targets 
within armed conflict and counterterrorism operations, forming a 
central platform in United States operations from Pakistan to 
Somalia.  One major topic of debate and a steady source of news is 
the number of civilian casualties from such strikes.  Estimates of 
the number of civilians killed in U.S. drone strikes over the past 
several years vary wildly, with some reports in the thousands and 
others in the hundreds.9  In contrast, the U.S. government recently 
announced that Central Intelligence Agency (―CIA‖) drone strikes 
in Pakistan have caused zero civilian casualties in the past year.10 
The debate over civilian casualties goes far beyond war, 
incorporating the morality of targeted killing, the viability of U.S. 
 
5 See Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Expands its Drone War into Somalia, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2011, at A1 (discussing the expansion of drone strikes into 
Somalia on a theory of collaboration between Islamic militants in Yemen and 
Somalia). 
6 See Siobhan Gorman & Adam Entous, CIA Plans Yemen Drone Strikes, WALL 
ST. J., June 14, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424052702303848104576384051572679110.html (―The Central Intelligence 
Agency is preparing to launch a secret program to kill al Qaeda militants in 
Yemen . . . .‖). 
7 See Dina Temple-Raston, Drone Strike Ends Hunt for Al-Qaida Leader, NPR, 
Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/09/30/140958027/drone-strike-ends-
hunt-for-al-qaida-leader (detailing a U.S. drone missile attack to kill Anwar al-
Awlaki while al-Awlaki travelled in a convoy of cars). 
8 See Graeme Smith, Pakistan‟s Deadly Robots in the Sky, GLOBE AND MAIL, 
Apr. 12, 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/asia-
pacific/pakistans-deadly-robots-in-the-sky/article1739172/singlepage/ 
(discussing the increasing number of drones being fired into the tribal areas of 
Pakistan). 
9 Perhaps the most well-known and respected study on this data is that 
collected by the New America Foundation in 2011: The Year of the Drone, supra note 
1.  According to its findings, non-militant fatalities comprise approximately 
twenty percent of all casualties from U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan. 
10 See Scott Shane, C.I.A. is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011, at A1 (presenting the public debate over the CIA‘s 
contention that U.S. drone strikes into Pakistan caused no civilian deaths in 2011). 
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counterinsurgency strategy, and the parameters of self-defense 
against terrorists.  However, the debate puts a laser focus on the 
impact of drone strikes on interpretations of the law of armed 
conflict.  These issues range from potential new—and possibly 
problematic—understandings of key principles to questions 
regarding the geographical parameters of the battlefield and the 
impact of non-military personnel engaging in drone strikes. 
Drones, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned aerial 
combat vehicles, remotely piloted weapons—a long list of names 
currently describes the enormous range of aerial vehicles that do 
not carry a human operator.  The U.S. Department of Defense 
defines an unmanned aerial vehicle as: 
[a] powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human 
operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, 
can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be 
expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or 
nonlethal payload.  Ballistic or semiballistic vehicles, cruise 
missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered 
unmanned aerial vehicles.11 
It is important to note, however, that drones are not truly 
―unmanned,‖ but rather remotely piloted.  In fact, experts have 
noted that the operation of drones involves more people than F-16s 
or other fighter planes piloted in-person.12  For example, beyond 
the pilot and the sensor operator, who operate the vehicle from a 
remote location, recoverable drones also involve launch and 
recovery teams, numerous intelligence analysts, and other legal 
and operational decision-makers.13  Many therefore favor the term 
―remotely piloted aircraft,‖ but since ―drone‖ is one of the most 
commonly used terms, this Article will continue to use it as well. 
 
11 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1–02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY 
OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 571 (2009). 
12 See, e.g., Charles Blanchard, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Air Force, Remarks made at 
New America Foundation conference: Drones, Remote Targeting and the Promise 
of Law, Panel II (Feb. 24, 2011), available at http://www.ustream.tv 
/recorded/12909598 (describing the drone targeting and acquisition process). 
13 See Scott Shane & Thom Shanker, Yemen Strike Reflects U.S. Shift to Drones as 
Cheaper Tool of War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, at 1, 14 (stating that ―[b]ehind each 
aircraft is a team of 150 or more personnel, repairing and maintaining the plane 
and the heap of ground technology that keeps it in the air, poring over the hours 
of videos and radio signals it collects, and gathering the voluminous intelligence 
necessary to prompt a single strike‖). 
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During the past decade, the number and variety of drones have 
increased dramatically.  ―Within the current United States 
inventory, [drones] range in size from the Wasp and the Raven, at 
38 inches long, both of which are ‗launched‘ by being thrown in the 
air by hand, to the twenty-seven foot long Predator and the forty-
foot long Global Hawk.‖14  The most commonly-used drones in the 
U.S. arsenal are the MQ-9 Reaper and the MQ-1B Predator, both of 
which are designed for persistent intelligence, reconnaissance, and 
surveillance, as well as target acquisition and ―destroy and 
disable‖ capabilities.15  Both systems are armed with Hellfire 
missiles.16  Another example is the tiny helicopter drone Libyan 
rebels used to coordinate attacks.17  At present, the United States 
and Israel are the only countries using armed drones, although 
Canada recently announced that it planned to acquire and use 
armed drones in the near future.18  More than forty countries—and 
some non-state actors—possess and employ unarmed drones, 
including Russia, India, Pakistan, China, and Iran.19 
The U.S. drone program has sparked extensive and intense 
public commentary—academic, policy-oriented, and media—
regarding targeted killing of terrorist operatives using armed 
drones.  However, such attacks comprise only a small portion of 
 
14 See Chris Jenks, Law from Above: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force, and 
the Law of Armed Conflict, 85 N.D. L. REV. 649, 653 (2009) (citing P.W. Singer, 
Military Robots and the Laws of War, NEW ATLANTIS, Winter 2009, at 25, 37–39) 
(explaining the variety of U.S. drone systems). 
15 MQ-9 Reaper Factsheet, WWW.AF.MIL, Jan. 5, 2012, http://www.af.mil 
/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6405; MQ-1B Predator Factsheet, 
WWW.AF.MIL, Jan. 5, 2012, http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets 
/factsheet.asp?id=122. 
16 MQ-9 Reaper Factsheet, supra note 15; MQ-1B Predator Factsheet, supra note 
15. 
17 See Ian Austen, Libyan Rebels Reportedly Used Tiny Canadian Surveillance 
Drone, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2011, at A11 (reporting on the sale of a commercial 
Canadian drone to Libyan rebels).  
18 See Canada to Acquire Attack Drones: Air Chief, CBC NEWS, Mar. 6, 2009, 
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/03/06/cdn-drones.html (quoting senior 
Canadian military official Lt. Gen. Angus Watt‘s saying, ―Armed unmanned 
aerial vehicles [UAVs] with air to ground weapons are a valuable capability and . . 
. a good option for Canadians to have‖); see also Joel Greenberg, Gaza Cease-Fire 
Tested by Israeli Airstrike, Palestinian Rocket Fire, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2011 
(discussing Israel‘s use of armed drones to attack militants). 
19 See Jenks, supra note 14, at 654 (noting UAV capabilities of various 
countries and non-state actors, including Hezbollah, which used drones along the 
Israel-Lebanon border during the 2006 Lebanon War). 
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the various ways in which drones are or can be used.  Drones are 
used extensively for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR), including identification of targets, and to support troops on 
the ground.20  In the past several years, there has been extensive 
academic and policy debate regarding the lawfulness of UAV 
strikes and other targeted killings of al Qaeda and other operatives.  
A host of interesting questions arise from this use of drones, 
including the use of force in self-defense against non-state actors, 
the use of force across state boundaries, the nature and content of 
state consent to such operations, and the use of targeted killing as a 
lawful and effective counterterrorism measure.21  These issues do 
not stem from the particular weapon or weapons system; instead 
they flow naturally from the jus ad bellum, the law governing the 
resort to force as enshrined in the United Nations Charter.22  Thus, 
although in some situations the nature of drones might enable a 
broader range of options for the use of force,23 the issues raised 
above are generally not drone-specific.  Rather, they address 
 
20 See Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Attacks Under the Jus ad Bellum and Jus in 
Bello: Clearing the „Fog of Law,‟ 13 Y.B. INT‘L HUMANITARIAN L. 311, 311–26 (2010) 
(illustrating the exponential increase in drone use and how drones are used 
against Taliban operations and militants); Henry Kenyon, Army Deploys More 
Small Drones in ISR Surge, DEF. SYS., June 24, 2011, 
http://defensesystems.com/articles/2011/06/24/army-briefing-uas-
platforms.aspx (―The Army is getting ready to deploy additional numbers of 
unmanned aircraft systems in Southwest Asia.  Ranging from large, long-duration 
platforms to small, hand-launched tactical platforms, these new systems will 
support warfighters . . . .‖). 
21 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targeting of Non-State Actors and 
Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT‘L L. & POL‘Y 237, 280 
(2010) (analyzing the acceptability of using drones in self-defense); Kenneth 
Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law (Brookings 
Inst., Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., & Hoover Inst. Series on Counterterrorism and 
Am. Statutory Law, Working Paper No. 9, 2009) available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0511_counterterrorism_anderson.aspx 
(explaining President Obama‘s authorization of the use of drones).  See also 
Schmitt, supra note 20, at 313–15 (analyzing the use of drone strikes under jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello). 
22 The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force, art. 2(4), with two 
exceptions: the right to self-defence, art. 51, and the multilateral use of force 
authorized by the Security Council under art. 43.  U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; U.N. 
Charter art. 51; U.N. Charter art. 43. 
23 See Mary Ellen O‘Connell, Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal 
Operations, J.L. INFO. & SCI. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that drones have made the 
use of force more likely due to the reduced domestic political consequences from 
their use, as opposed to the use of manned airborne weapons platforms). 
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complex contemporary challenges posed by transnational 
terrorism and the proliferation of conflict between states and non-
state actors. 
This Article focuses on contemporary jus in bello (law of war) 
questions posed by the use of drones and will analyze drones as a 
weapons system within the law of armed conflict, leaving the jus ad 
bellum questions aside.  Questions regarding the use of drones for 
targeted killings of terrorist operatives outside of armed conflict—
or for any other purpose outside of armed conflict—raise 
interesting and challenging legal issues, but remain outside the 
scope of this Article.  
The first Section will address foundational questions regarding 
the application of the law of armed conflict to drones, including the 
legality of armed drones as a weapons system and their use in 
accordance with the key law of armed conflict requirements of 
distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack.  Although 
many argue that the ―joystick mentality‖24 of remotely piloted 
aircraft and weapons can lead to desensitization and a decreased 
likelihood of adherence to international norms,25 the examination 
below demonstrates that drones indeed offer extensive and 
enhanced opportunities for compliance with the law of armed 
conflict. 
In the second Section, this Article will explore how the 
burgeoning use of armed drones raises new questions for some 
traditional concepts and categories within the law of armed 
conflict, such as the status of persons and the geographical locus of 
attacks and hostilities, and potentially new challenges in the 
implementation of distinction and proportionality.  Drones‘ 
―capacity for persistent surveillance [has] given unprecedented 
intelligence capabilities to U.S. and allied military forces in Iraq 
 
24 See Dennis Kucinich, Drones Direct Hit Upon Rule of Law, HUFFINGTON POST 
Aug. 17, 2011, 11:27 AM, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-dennis-
kucinich/drones-direct-hit-upon-ru_b_929203.html (―[W]e have slipped into [a] 
spooky new world where joystick gods manipulating robots deal death from the 
skies and then go home and hug their children.‖). 
25 See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
Study on Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, ¶ 84, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Alston 
Report] (suggesting that drone operators could potentially be inclined to 
disregard combat norms because they control the weapons far from the actual 
battlefield, described as the ―Playstation mentality‖). 
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and Afghanistan, [often] . . . . reshaping the capability of military 
commanders and their advisers to comply with law-of-war 
obligations . . . .‖26  Notwithstanding significant hue and cry 
regarding their use during the past several years, the use of armed 
drones offers the potential for improved law of armed conflict 
compliance and protection of civilians during armed conflict. 
1. DRONES AND LOAC:  A FOUNDATIONAL ANALYSIS 
The law of armed conflict (LOAC), otherwise known as 
international humanitarian law or the law of war, applies to 
situations of armed conflict and governs the conduct of hostilities 
and the protection of persons during conflict.27  At its foundation, 
LOAC is based on four key principles, which undergird the spirit 
and purpose of the law and drive determinations in areas such as 
targeting, detention, and treatment of persons.  The principle of 
distinction mandates that all parties to a conflict distinguish 
between those who are fighting and those who are not, and direct 
attacks only at the former.28  The principle of proportionality seeks 
to minimize incidental casualties during war and operationalizes 
 
26 Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual Era, 103 AM. J. INT‘L L. 409, 417 
(2009). 
27 See War and International Humanitarian Law, INT‘L COMM. RED CROSS, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (explaining 
that international rules are in place to ―limit the effects of armed conflict for 
humanitarian reasons‖).  The law of armed conflict is set forth primarily in the 
four Geneva Conventions of August 14, 1949 and their Additional Protocols.  See 
generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
[hereinafter AP II]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 
75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. 
28 See AP I, supra note 27, art. 48 (―Parties to the conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives.‖). 
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LOAC‘s fundamental premise that the means and methods of 
attacking the enemy are not unlimited.29  Thus, a commander must 
refrain from any attack in which the expected civilian casualties 
will be excessive in light of the anticipated military advantage 
gained.30  The principle of military necessity recognizes that a 
military has the right to use any measures not forbidden by the 
laws of war that are ―indispensible for securing the complete 
submission of the enemy as soon as possible.‖31  Finally, the fourth 
principle is the principle of humanity, also commonly referred to 
as the principle of unnecessary suffering, and aims to minimize 
suffering in armed conflict.32  Once a military purpose has been 
achieved, the infliction of further suffering is unnecessary.  In 
 
29 See id. art. 35(1) (establishing the principle that parties to a conflict may not 
use any ―methods or means of warfare‖ whatsoever). 
30 See id. art. 51(5)(b) (defining any ―attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated‖ as an indiscriminate attack and therefore 
prohibited). 
31 DEP‘T OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE 
LAW OF LAND WARFARE 4 (1956).  The Lieber Code provides the earliest 
codification of military necessity: Article 14 states ―those measures which are 
indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to 
the modern law and usages of war;‖ and Article 16 states: 
[M]ilitary necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of 
suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or 
wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions.  It does not 
admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a 
district. 
FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED 
STATES IN THE FIELD (Gov‘t Printing Office 1898) (1863) [hereinafter LIEBER CODE], 
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument. 
32 The Martens Clause is the clearest statement of the principle of humanity, 
found in the preamble to the Hague Convention of 1899: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High 
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in 
the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain 
under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as 
they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from 
the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.   
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, pmbl, July 
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803. 
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addition, weapons that by their nature cause unnecessary suffering 
are outlawed.33 
1.1. Drones are Lawful Weapons 
As the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Arbitrary or Summary Executions stated in his recent report on 
targeted killings, ―a missile fired from a drone is no different from 
any other commonly used weapon, including a gun fired by a 
soldier or a helicopter or gunship that fires missiles.  The critical 
legal question is the same for each weapon:  whether its specific 
use complies with IHL.‖34  The first question, addressed in this 
Section, is whether a particular weapon is prohibited due to its 
inherent characteristics.  Section 2 below will examine whether 
armed drones are used in accordance with international law 
principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions. 
International law prohibits two categories of weapons in armed 
conflict:  indiscriminate weapons and weapons that cause 
unnecessary suffering.  The first prohibition appears in Article 
51(4) of Additional Protocol I, which defines indiscriminate attacks 
as (1) attacks ―not directed at a specific military objective,‖ (2) 
attacks ―which employ a method or means of combat which cannot 
be directed at a military objective,‖ or (3) attacks ―which employ a 
method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited 
as required by this Protocol.‖35  Means of combat generally refers 
to weapons or weapons systems.  Thus, as the International Court 
of Justice declared in its advisory opinion in the Legality of the 
 
33 See AP I, note 27, art. 35(2) (prohibiting the use of weapons and methods of 
warfare that cause ―superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering‖). 
34 Alston Report, supra note 25, ¶ 79. 
35 AP I, supra note 27, art. 51(4)(a)–(c).  In addition, Article 35 of Additional 
Protocol I sets forth the following basic rules: 
     1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the 
conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not 
unlimited. 
     2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and 
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 
     3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare 
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, 
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. 
Id. art. 35(1)–(3). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
02 BLANK (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2012  5:40 PM 
684 U. Pa. J. Int‟l L. [Vol. 33:3 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, parties to a conflict may not ―use 
weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and 
military targets.‖36  There is little doubt that any weapon can be 
used in an indiscriminate way during conflict, such as spraying 
machine gun fire into a crowd with no regard for the presence of 
civilians or others who are hors de combat.  Such illegal use does not 
make the machine gun an unlawful weapon, however.  One 
example of inherently indiscriminate weapons is the rockets that 
Hamas and Hezbollah have fired into Israel for many years.37 
The ban on indiscriminate weapons focuses on those weapons 
that are, by design or other shortcoming, ―incapable of being 
targeted at a military objective only, even if collateral harm 
occurs.‖38  The ban on indiscriminate effects encompasses both 
these types of indiscriminate weapons and the use of otherwise 
lawful weapons in an indiscriminate manner.  For example, the use 
of cluster munitions is highly disputed for this reason.39  As the 
International Committee of the Red Cross has stated, 
―[t]hese characteristics [of cluster munitions] raise serious 
questions as to whether such weapons can be used in 
populated areas in accordance with the rule of distinction 
and the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks.  The wide 
area effects of these weapons and the large number of 
unguided submunitions released would appear to make it 
 
36 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 257 [¶ 78] (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. 
37 See, e.g., Gaza/Israel: Hamas Rocket Attacks on Civilians Unlawful, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/06/gazaisrael-
hamas-rocket-attacks-civilians-unlawful (noting that the rockets Hamas has fired 
on Israel are indiscriminate because ―they cannot be aimed with any reliability‖). 
38 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 588–89 [¶ 
24] (July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins).  Examples could include 
missiles with a faulty guidance system resulting in an inability to aim only at 
military objectives or biological weapons that can spread contagion among the 
civilian population when not checked by an antidote.  Michael N. Schmitt, Future 
War and the Principle of Discrimination, 28 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 51, 55 (1998). 
39 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgement, ¶ 463 (Int‘l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007) (holding that ―the M-87 
Orkan, by virtue of its characteristics and the firing range in this specific instance, 
was incapable of hitting specific targets . . . . [thereby rendering it] an 
indiscriminate weapon, the use of which in densely populated civilian areas, such 
as Zagreb, will result in the infliction of severe casualties.‖). 
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difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between military 
objectives and civilians in a populated target area.‖40 
Others argue that cluster munitions may well be a more 
discriminating weapon in certain circumstances because if they 
were banned, many more missions would be needed to achieve the 
same effect and cover the same amount of area.  By increasing the 
number of missions, the attacking force consequently would 
expose more of its force and more civilians to a heightened risk.41  
Further, cluster munitions could reduce collateral damage because 
of their small detonating impact; otherwise, forces would have to 
use a more highly explosive weapon to accomplish the same 
military goal, thereby creating more damage.42 
Second, weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or 
superfluous injury are prohibited.  The goal is to minimize harm 
that is not justified by military utility, either because of a lack of 
any utility at all or because the utility gained is considerably 
outweighed by the suffering caused.43  The international 
community‘s first effort at regulating weapons was the St. 
Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of 
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight of December 11, 
1868, which sought to outlaw ―the employment of arms which 
uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their 
death inevitable.‖44  Repeated in Article 23(e) of the Annex to the 
 
40 Int‘l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Observations on the Legal Issues 
Related to the Use of Cluster Munitions, ¶ 8, Grp. of Gov‘t Experts of High 
Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, U.N. 
Doc. CCW/GGE/2007/WP.8 (June 25, 2007). 
41 See Nout van Woudenberg, The Long and Winding Road Towards an 
Instrument on Cluster Munitions, 12 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 447, 450 (2007) (―[W]here 
use is made of an alternative to cluster weapons, more missions are needed in 
order to cover the same area.‖); see also Thomas J. Herthel, On the Chopping Block: 
Cluster Munitions and the Law of War, 51 A.F.L. REV. 229, 258–59 (2001) (noting that 
cluster munitions may be deployed lawfully in certain circumstances). 
42 See van Woudenberg, supra note 41, at 450 (explaining that, in particular 
situations, cluster weapons can pose less danger to civilian populations than 
weapons that have larger explosive charges). 
43 See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 401 [¶ 1414], (Claude Pilloud et al. 
eds., 1987) [hereinafter PROTOCOL COMMENTARY] (―The principle is that of the 
prohibition of weapons which would unnecessarily increase the suffering of men 
rendered hors de combat, or which would inevitably lead to their death.‖). 
44 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles 
Under 400 Grammes Weight pmbl., Nov. 29–Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in 1 
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1907 Hague Convention IV, this prohibition is recognized as 
customary international law.45  The International Court of Justice 
emphasized this norm as the second of two cardinal principles of 
international law, explaining that 
it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to 
combatants:  it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons 
causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their 
suffering.  In application of that second principle, States do 
not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the 
weapons they use.46 
The basic idea behind the prohibition on weapons that cause 
unnecessary suffering is that weapons that increase suffering— 
specifically that of combatants—without increasing military 
advantage in any way are unlawful.  Expanding bullets and 
blinding lasers offer two examples.  Certainly many weapons cause 
extensive—even horrible—suffering and injury, but that in and of 
itself is not the key issue.  The analysis hinges on two primary 
factors:  ―(a) whether an alternative weapon is available, causing 
less injury or suffering; and . . . (b) whether the effects produced by 
the alternative weapon are sufficiently effective in neutralizing 
enemy personnel.‖47 
By both measures — indiscriminate weapon or effects and 
unnecessary suffering—armed drones pass muster.  Armed drones 
fire Hellfire missiles and other similar munitions, all of which are 
also carried by or are similar to the weapons carried by piloted 
 
SUPPLEMENT AM. J. INT‘L L. 95 (1907) [hereinafter The Declaration of St. Petersburg, 
1868]. 
45 See Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(e), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 
[hereinafter Hague Convention No. IV] (―In addition to the prohibitions provided 
by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden . . . (e) To employ arms, 
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering‖); see also W. 
Hays Parks, Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 8 Y.B. INT‘L 
HUMANITARIAN L. 55, 120 (2005) (asserting that, of the many provisions dealing 
with the use of conventional weapons, Article 23(e) of the Hague Convention IV is 
perhaps the only one that is clearly respected as ―customary international law‖). 
46 See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 36, at 275 [¶ 78]. 
47 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 60 (2004) (citing NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF 
ARMED CONFLICTS, COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1997 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 196 (Michael Bothe et al. eds., 1982). 
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fighter aircraft.48  These missiles are not banned by any 
international agreement and do not manifest any characteristics 
that cause superfluous injury as understood in international law.  
In fact, the precision-guided munitions that drones carry and their 
extensive surveillance capabilities make them particularly 
discriminate weapons.  The ability to track a target for hours, even 
days, before launching an attack facilitates accurate targeting and 
enhances the protection of civilians by giving drone operators the 
ability to choose the time and place of attack with an eye towards 
minimizing civilian casualties or damage.  Therefore, armed 
drones can easily be aimed at only military objectives and have 
effects that can be limited, as much as possible, to military objects, 
thus meeting the standards in Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol 
I.49 
The fact that armed drones could be used—and perhaps have 
been used—in indiscriminate attacks does not make them an 
inherently unlawful weapon or weapons system.  Determinations 
of legality, such as those required in new weapons reviews under 
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I,50 do not mean that states must 
anticipate any possible unlawful use of a weapon.  Rather, as noted 
at the 1974–1977 Diplomatic Conference that produced the 
Additional Protocols, the question is ―whether the employment of 
a weapon for its normal or expected use would be prohibited 
under some or all circumstances.  A State is not required to foresee 
or analyze all possible misuses of a weapon, for almost any 
weapon can be misused in ways that would be prohibited.‖51  The 
normal or expected use of armed drones falls clearly within the 
parameters of lawful weapons under international law. 
 
48 See, e.g., MQ-1B Predator Fact Sheet, supra note 15 (noting that the MQ-1B 
remotely piloted drone carries AGM-114 Hellfire missiles); MQ-9 Reaper Factsheet, 
supra note 15 (noting that the MQ-9 remotely piloted drone carries Hellfire 
missiles). 
49 For an articulation of Article 51(4)‘s required elements, see supra Section 
1.1, note 35  and accompanying text. 
50 See AP I, supra note 27, art. 36 (―In the study, development, acquisition or 
adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting 
Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some 
or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of 
international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.‖). 
51 See PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 43, at 424 [¶ 1469]. 
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1.2. Lawful Use of Drones 
Upon a determination that armed drones are lawful weapons, 
the next step is to examine how they are being used and whether 
such use complies with, and perhaps even enhances, the 
implementation of LOAC.  As noted above, a lawful weapon can 
be used unlawfully in certain circumstances, such as in deliberate 
attacks on civilians or in indiscriminate attacks.  In order to comply 
with LOAC, parties launching attacks must abide by the principle 
of distinction, the principle of proportionality and the obligation of 
precautions in attack.  Access to reliable factual information about 
the United States UAV strikes in Afghanistan, northwest Pakistan, 
Yemen, or other locations, for example, is difficult to obtain in 
many circumstances.52  Disputes regarding facts on the ground, 
numbers of persons killed, identities of those killed, and other key 
information do impact the ability to analyze compliance with 
LOAC norms.  However, it is reasonable, in light of existing 
information, to examine the use of armed drones within the 
framework of the central principles of distinction, proportionality, 
and precautions. 
Many critics argue that drones ―make it easier to kill without 
risk to a State‘s forces, [so] policy makers and commanders will be 
tempted to interpret the legal limitations on who can be killed, and 
under what circumstances, too expansively.‖53  The analysis below, 
however, will demonstrate that, as one international legal expert 
explains: 
[T]here is little reason to treat drones as distinct from other 
weapons systems with regard to the legal consequences of 
their employment.  Nor is there a sound basis for 
heightened concern as to their use.  On the contrary, the use 
of drones may actually, in certain cases, enhance the 
protections to which various persons and objects are 
entitled under [LOAC].54 
The extensive capabilities of drones urge examination not only of 
whether their use complies with LOAC, but also whether they 
 
52 See e.g., Shane, supra note 10 (noting a wide disparity between the official 
American record of civilian casualties and unofficial sources). 
53 Alston Report, supra note 25, ¶ 80. 
54 Schmitt, supra note 20, at 313. 
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offer better opportunities for adherence to the law.  Drones ―now 
not only perform persistent surveillance to identify and track 
targets—on missions that may exceed the limited endurance and 
skills of human pilots—but also constitute lethal weapons 
platforms with a continuous presence, enabling attacks on more 
targets in more situations than ever before.‖55  Many more 
situations triggering analysis of LOAC‘s key principles therefore 
arise with the use of armed drones. 
1.2.1.  Distinction 
Identifying who or what can be targeted is one of the most 
fundamental issues during conflict.  In traditional conflicts, one 
could distinguish between soldiers—who wore uniforms—and 
civilians—who typically did not venture near the battlefield — in 
most circumstances.  Similarly, identifying military and civilian 
objects was usually feasible.  Contemporary conflicts introduce a 
whole set of new challenges in this area, however, demanding 
ever-greater efforts—through intelligence-gathering and 
surveillance—to determine who is who in the zone of combat 
operations.56 
Article 48 of Additional Protocol I sets forth the fundamentals 
of the principle of distinction: 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict 
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives.57 
Distinction lies at the core of IHL‘s seminal goal of protecting 
innocent civilians and persons who are hors de combat.  The 
obligation to distinguish forms part of the customary international 
law of both international and non-international armed conflicts, as 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
 
55  Beard, supra note 26, at 414. 
56 See Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: 
Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT‘L SEC. J. 45, 
45–48 (2010) (analyzing the challenges of implementing the law of war in 
contemporary state versus non-state actor conflicts). 
57 AP I, supra note 27, art. 48. 
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(―ICTY‖) held in the Tadic case.58  As a result, all parties to any 
conflict are obligated to distinguish between combatants, or 
fighters, and civilians, and concomitantly, to distinguish 
themselves from civilians and their own military objects from 
civilian objects. 
The purpose of distinction—to protect civilians—is emphasized 
in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, which states that ―[t]he 
civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not 
be the object of attack.‖59  Article 51 continues, stating: 
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.  Indiscriminate 
attacks are:  (a) those which are not directed at a specific 
military objective; (b) those which employ a method or 
means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific 
military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or 
means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as 
required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such 
case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects without distinction.60 
 
58 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 111, 127 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (citing U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2675: ―Bearing 
in mind the need for measures to ensure the better protection of human rights in 
armed conflicts of all types . . . [the General Assembly] affirms the following basic 
principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, without 
prejudice to their future elaboration within the framework of progressive 
development of the international law of armed conflict: . . . 2. [I]n the conduct of 
military operations during armed conflicts, a distinction must be made at all times 
between persons actively taking part in the hostilities and civilian populations‖).  
See also Nuclear Weapons, supra note 36, at 257 [¶ 79] (―[T]hese fundamental rules 
are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions 
that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of 
international customary law.‖); JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME 1: RULES, at rules 3–11, 
25–32, 34–76 (2005) [hereinafter CIHL] (referencing rules based on the principle of 
distinction that have become part of customary international law); Abella v. 
Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., Report No. 55/97, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev., ¶ 177 (1998) (noting that the obligation to 
distinguish between combatants and civilians is customary international law). 
59 AP I, supra note 27, art. 51(2). 
60 Id. art. 51(4). 
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Furthermore, Article 85 of Protocol I declares that nearly all 
violations of distinction constitute grave breaches of the Protocol,61 
and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court similarly 
criminalizes attacks on civilians and indiscriminate attacks.62 
Upon examination, several features of drones and aspects of 
how armed drones are used demonstrate a substantial, even 
heightened ability to conform to distinction‘s obligations.  It is 
important to note, again, that armed drones, like any other weapon 
or weapon system, can be used to engage in deliberate or 
indiscriminate attacks against civilians or other protected 
individuals during armed conflict.  The first aspect of distinction in 
which drones offer extensive capabilities is in the identification of 
targets.  A lawful attack must be directed at a legitimate target:  
either a combatant or a civilian directly participating in hostilities.  
In international armed conflicts—those occurring between states—
all members of the state‘s regular armed forces are combatants and 
can be identified by the uniform they wear, among other 
 
61 Id. art. 85(3) (―[T]he following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of 
this Protocol, when committed wilfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of 
this Protocol, and causing death or serious injury to body or health: (a) making the 
civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack; (b) launching an 
indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the 
knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2(a)(iii) . . . .‖). 
62 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(b)(i–ii) & 
(iv–vi), 8(2)(e)(i–ii & iv), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter 
Rome Statute] (―For the purpose of this Statute, ‗war crimes‘ means: . . . 
[i]ntentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; [i]ntentionally directing 
attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives; . . . 
[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which 
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated; [a]ttacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, 
villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military 
objectives; [k]illing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or 
having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion; . . . 
[i]ntentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and 
transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva 
Conventions in conformity with international law; . . . [i]ntentionally directing 
attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable 
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded 
are collected, provided they are not military objectives . . . .‖). 
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characteristics.63  In state versus non-state actor conflicts, including 
counterterrorism operations within the context of an armed 
conflict, determining who is a legitimate target is significantly 
more complex.  The legal obligation remains the same, however, 
requiring parties ―to distinguish between an innocent civilian and 
an individual who, although dressed in civilian attire, may pose an 
immediate threat and is therefore a legitimate target.‖64  In 
addition, a commander must assess whether and when to target 
manifestly hostile persons deliberately hiding among the civilian 
population. 
Persons who are members of an organized armed group are 
legitimate targets at all times65—but dress the same as civilians 
either for a lack of uniforms or specifically to blend into the civilian 
population for protection.  In such cases, the surveillance capability 
of drones plays an essential role in differentiating such persons 
from innocent civilians.  A second category of legitimate target, as 
noted above, is the civilian directly participating in hostilities.  The 
concept of what constitutes direct participation has been the 
subject of extensive analysis and debate and is outside the scope of 
this Article.66  Nonetheless, regardless of the particular parameters 
 
63 See GC III, supra note 27, at art. 4(A) (providing that all members of the 
regular armed forces of a State party to an international armed conflict are entitled 
to prisoner of war status and thus considered combatants). 
64 Blank & Guiora, supra note 56, at 58. 
65 See Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT‘L REV. RED CROSS 991, 995 
(2008) (adopted by ICRC Assembly Feb. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.cicr.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf 
[hereinafter Interpretive Guidance] (stating that organized armed groups are 
targetable based on status in non-international armed conflict).  See also JIMMY 
GURULÉ & GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW 70–76 (2011) 
(discussing the rules governing targeting of enemy forces in international and 
non-international armed conflict and noting ―a member of an enemy force . . . is 
presumed hostile and therefore presumptively subject to attack‖ in international 
armed conflict, and ―[s]ubjecting members of organized belligerent groups to 
status based targeting pursuant to the LOAC as opposed to civilians who 
periodically lose their protection from attack seems both logical and consistent 
with the practice of states engaged in non-international armed conflicts‖). 
66 See generally Melzer, supra note 65; Forum, Direct Participation in Hostilities: 
Perspectives on the ICRC Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 637 (2010).  
See also HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov‘t of Israel, 57(6) 
IsrSC 285, ¶¶ 34–37 [2006] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il 
/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf [hereinafter Targeted Killings Case] 
(analyzing the meaning of direct participation in hostilities for the purpose of 
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of direct participation, the essence of the targeting determination in 
this situation is that persons directly participating in hostilities—
whether all the time or only once or intermittently—must be 
distinguished from innocent civilians.67  As in the case of members 
of organized groups who appear to be civilians, intelligence 
information and extensive surveillance will be the key to accurate 
and discriminatory targeting of such persons—and thus the key to 
protection of innocent civilians from the consequences of combat 
operations.  When neither hostile persons nor members of armed 
groups wear uniforms or carry their arms openly, the intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of drones offer great 
benefits for the implementation of the obligation of distinction. 
Drone attacks rely on high resolution imagery usually 
transmitted in real time to a drone crew which, 
undistracted by any threat, engages the target.  When 
feasible and necessary, drones can be used to carefully 
monitor the potential target for extended periods before 
engaging it with precision weapons.  Compared to attacks 
by manned aircraft or ground-based systems, the result is 
often a significantly reduced risk of misidentifying the 
target [or attacking the wrong target].68 
Using drones, commanders can track and analyze the daily 
activities of suspected militants, helping to ensure that civilians are 
not mistakenly targeted.  For such planned targets, the ―pattern of 
life analysis‖69—an assessment of who lives and works in a 
particular structure or area—is a linchpin of distinction.  
―Unmanned systems [therefore] seem to offer several ways of 
 
determining the legality of Israel‘s policy of targeted killings, and concluding that 
the legality of such strikes must be determined on a case-by-case basis). 
67 See Targeted Killings Case, 57(6) IsrSC 285, ¶¶ 31–33 & 40, available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf 
(highlighting the importance of the direct participation analysis for the effective 
implementation of the principle of distinction). 
68 Schmitt, supra note 20, at 320. 
69 For example, until at least August 2010 in Afghanistan, the International 
Security Assistance Force rules of engagement mandated a forty-eight-hour 
pattern of life assessment before any target could be approved.  See Rajiv 
Chandrasekaran, Petraeus Reviews Directive Meant to Limit Afghan Civilian Deaths, 
WASH. POST, July 9, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/08/AR2010070806219.html (describing General 
Petraeus‘s intention to review the tactical directive giving rise to the 48-hour rule). 
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reducing the mistakes and unintended costs of war,‖ such as using 
―far better sensors and processing power,‖ ―allow[ing] decisions to 
be made in a more deliberate manner‖ and ―remov[ing] the anger 
and emotion from the humans behind them.‖70 
1.2.2.  Proportionality 
Once a legitimate target is identified, the legal analysis does not 
end.  Rather, the attacking party must then assess whether the 
attack satisfies the principle of proportionality.71  LOAC flatly 
prohibits any intentional targeting of civilians, but armed conflict 
involves an infinite array of circumstances in which civilians may 
die or suffer grievous injury as a result of attacks launched directly 
at military targets and combatants.  Technical malfunctions, 
inclement weather, faulty intelligence and navigation errors can all 
also cause a bomb to fall short and cause significant unanticipated 
civilian casualties.  Beyond errors and accidents, on many 
occasions, a commander can anticipate that some civilians will 
suffer harm:  there may be civilians near the person being targeted 
or in a building or location identified as a legitimate target.  The 
commander planning the attack may have a range of choices in 
terms of tactics and weapons in attacking the target, which could 
result in different consequences for civilians in the area; in some 
situations, there may only be one option. 
LOAC seeks to minimize such incidental civilian casualties as 
well, such that proportionality effectively operationalizes LOAC‘s 
fundamental premise that the means and methods of attacking the 
enemy are not unlimited.  Article 35 of Additional Protocol I 
 
70 P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of War, NEW ATLANTIS, Winter 
2009, at 25, 40–41, available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib 
/20090203_TNA23Singer.pdf.  See also Anna Mulrine, A Look Inside the Air Force‟s 
Control Center for Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 29, 2008, 
available at http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2008/05/29/a-look-
inside-the-air-forces-control-center-for-iraq-and-afghanistan (explaining that 
Drones enable commanders to ―establish a ‗pattern of life‘ around potential 
targets—recording such things as the comings and goings of friends, school hours, 
and market times.  Despite the distance, the real-time video feeds often give them 
a better vantage point than an Army unit has just down the street from a group of 
insurgents.‖). 
71 See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 38, at 587 [¶ 20] (dissenting opinion of 
Judge Higgins) (―[E]ven a legitimate target may not be attacked if the collateral 
civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific military gain from the 
attack.‖). 
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declares that ―[i]n any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the 
conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited,‖ a 
basic principle that dates back at least to the 1907 Hague 
Convention.72  Importantly, however, the law does not prohibit all 
civilian deaths—and in fact accepts some incidental civilian 
casualties.73  At the same time, it does mandate that the only 
legitimate object of war is to weaken the military forces of the 
enemy.74  In this way, proportionality balances military necessity 
and humanity.  To protect innocent civilians from the effects of war 
and minimize undue suffering, LOAC prohibits disproportionate 
attacks.  Therefore, commanders must refrain from attacks where 
the expected loss of civilian life or damage to civilian property 
from an attack will be excessive in relation to the anticipated 
military advantage gained from the attack.75 
Collateral damage, a term seen regularly in news reports 
regarding drone strikes and targeted killing, refers to civilians 
killed in the course of attacks on military objectives—that is, the 
incidental casualties from an attack.  Given the focus of this Article 
on the lawfulness of armed drones within the law of armed 
conflict, it is crucial to understand a fundamental distinction 
between LOAC and human rights or domestic criminal law.  Both 
legal regimes forbid the deliberate killing of innocent civilians.76  
 
72  AP I, supra note 27, art. 35.  See Hague Convention No.  IV, supra note 45, 
art. 22 (―The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited.‖). 
73 See Judith Gardam, Necessity and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum and Jus in 
Bello, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 283–84 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999) 
(―The immunity of non-combatants from the effects of warfare . . . has never been 
regarded as absolute.  The incidence of some civilian casualties has always been 
tolerated as a consequence of military action.‖). 
74 See The Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868, supra note 44, pmbl. (―[T]he 
only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is 
to weaken the military force of the enemy . . . .‖). 
75 See AP I, supra note 27, art. 51(5) (―Among others, the following types of 
attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: . . . [a]n attack which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.‖).  The same language 
appears in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, which refers specifically to 
precautions in attack.  Id. art. 57(2)(b).  
76 See AP I, supra note 27, art. 51(2) (―The civilian population . . . shall not be 
the object of attack.‖); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (stating that every human being shall have an 
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LOAC, however, anticipates and accepts that parties may 
knowingly kill civilians without violating the law.  Thus, a party 
attacking a military objective may know for certain that some 
number of civilians—perhaps janitorial staff working in the 
building—will die when the building is hit.  Such knowledge does 
not mean the party has committed a crime; rather, LOAC allows 
for such incidental civilian casualties to the extent that they are not 
excessive in relation to the military advantage gained from the 
attack.77  The crux of the issue, therefore, is how to interpret 
―excessive‖ in relation to military advantage and from which 
perspective.78  As the very language of Additional Protocol I 
shows, referring to ―anticipated‖ military advantage and 
―expected‖ civilian casualties, proportionality must be viewed 
prospectively, not in hindsight.  Instead, the information available 
and the circumstances at the time of the military operation in 
question must govern how we approach the balance between 
military advantage and civilian casualties.  Because combat, even a 
minor firefight, involves confusion and uncertainty—the ―fog of 
war‖—these ―decisions cannot be judged on the basis of 
 
―inherent right to life‖); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (―Everyone‘s right to 
life shall be protected by law.  No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally 
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime 
for which this penalty is provided by law.‖). 
77 See W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990) 
(―Within both the Just War Tradition and the law of war, it has always been 
permissible to attack combatants even though some noncombatants may be 
injured or killed; so long as injury to noncombatants is ancillary (indirect and 
unintentional) to the attack of an otherwise lawful target, the principle of 
noncombatant immunity is met.‖). 
78 See Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack, in TESTING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277, 293 (Susan C. Breau & 
Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006) (―Focusing on excessiveness avoids the legal 
fiction that collateral damage, incidental injury, and military advantage can be 
precisely measured.‖); Joseph Holland, Military Objective and Collateral Damage: 
Their Relationship and Dynamics, 7 Y.B. INT‘L HUMANITARIAN L. 35, 47 (2004) 
(―Clearly, one cannot always attribute every civilian death after an attack to the 
attacker. . . . One cannot assess incidental civilian losses for which the attacker is 
responsible by simply conducting a body count.  Such an oversimplification is as 
superficial as assessing the quality of a hospital by only counting the bodies in its 
morgue.‖); William J. Fenrick, The Prosecution of Unlawful Attack Cases Before the 
ICTY, 7 Y.B. INT‘L HUMANITARIAN L. 153, 175 (2004) (―The actual results of the 
attack may assist in inferring the intent of the attacker as he or she launched the 
attack but what counts is what was in the mind of the decision maker when the 
attack was launched.‖). 
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information which has subsequently come to light.‖79  The 
proportionality of any attack—and thus both the anticipated 
military advantage and the expected civilian casualties—must  
thus be viewed from the perspective of the military commander on 
the ground, taking into account the information he or she had at 
the time. 
Just as with distinction, proportionality mandates that parties 
to a conflict gather and assess information about the target, the 
target area, and those persons and objects in the vicinity of the 
target.  In the context of proportionality, drones appear to be 
particularly well designed for adherence to these obligations.  The 
heart of this comprehensive surveillance and intelligence-gathering 
process is the ―pattern of life‖ analysis.  Using drones, which can 
loiter over a target and the surrounding area for days, commanders 
can follow a target and gather information about the civilian 
population in the area and the potential for civilian casualties in 
possible strike locations and at certain times. 
Because the drones provide high quality information about 
the target area in real-time (or near real-time), for extended 
periods and without risk to the operators, they [thus] 
permit more refined assessments of the likely collateral 
damage to civilians and civilian objects.  The ability of 
armed drones to observe the target area for long periods 
before attacking means the operators are better able to 
verify the nature of a proposed target and strike only when 
the opportunity to minimize collateral damage is at its 
height.80 
At a preliminary level, therefore, the capacity that armed 
drones offer for pre-attack surveillance and at-the-moment 
awareness of the target and civilians in the area offers great 
 
79 Canada, Reservations and Statements of Understanding made upon 
Ratification of Additional Protocol I, 20 Nov. 1990, § 7, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_ca_rule14.  See also, 
Belgium, Interpretative Declarations Made Upon Ratification of Additional 
Protocol I, 20 May 1986, § 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_be_rule15_SectionD (―[T]he only information on which 
[proportionality determinations] can possibly be taken is such relevant 
information as is then available and that it has been feasible from him to obtain 
for that purpose.‖). 
80 Schmitt, supra note 20, at 314. 
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opportunities for compliance with LOAC‘s proportionality 
obligations.  There is little doubt that better information about 
where and when civilians are present can help to minimize civilian 
casualties from strikes on military targets. 
1.2.3.  Precautions in Attack 
LOAC mandates that all parties take certain precautionary 
measures to protect civilians.  In many ways, the identification of 
military objectives and the proportionality considerations are, of 
course, precautions.  But the obligations of the parties to a conflict 
to take precautionary measures go beyond that.  Beginning at the 
broadest level, Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I states:  ―In the 
conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare 
the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.‖81  This 
provision is a direct outgrowth of, and supplement to, the Basic 
Rule in Article 48, which mandates that all parties distinguish 
between combatants and civilians, and between military objects 
and civilian objects.  The practical provisions forming the major 
portion of Article 57 discuss precautions to be taken specifically 
when launching an attack.  Precautions are, understandably, a 
critical component of the law‘s efforts to protect civilians and are of 
particular importance in densely populated areas or areas where 
civilians are at risk from the consequences of military operations.82  
For this reason, even if a target is legitimate under the laws of war, 
failure to take precautions can make an attack on that target 
unlawful. 
First, parties must do everything feasible to ensure that targets 
are military objectives.83  Doing so helps to protect civilians by 
limiting attacks to military targets, thus directly implementing the 
principle of distinction.  Second, they must choose the means and 
methods of attack with the aim of minimizing incidental civilian 
losses and damage.84  For example, during the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War, ―pilots were advised to attack bridges in urban areas along a 
longitudinal axis.  This measure was taken so that bombs that 
 
81 AP I, supra note 27, art. 57(1). 
82 See PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 43, at 679 [¶ 2190](―It is clear that 
the precautions prescribed here will be of greatest importance in urban areas 
because such areas are most densely populated.‖). 
83 AP I, supra note 27, art. 57(2)(a)(i). 
84 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii). 
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missed their targets—because they were dropped either too early 
or too late—would hopefully fall in the river and not on civilian 
housing.‖85  Another common method of taking precautions is to 
launch attacks on particular targets at night when the civilian 
population is not on the streets or at work, thus minimizing 
potential losses.  In addition, when choosing between two possible 
attacks offering similar military advantage, parties must choose the 
objective that offers the least likely harm to civilians and civilian 
objects.86  Each of these steps requires an attacking party to take 
affirmative action to preserve civilian immunity and minimize 
civilian casualties and damage—in effect, to take ―constant care.‖  
Proportionality considerations are also a major component of the 
precautions framework.  Parties are required to refrain from any 
attacks that would be disproportionate and to cancel any attacks 
when it becomes evident that the civilian losses would be excessive 
in light of the military advantage.87  Finally, Article 57(2)(c) of 
Additional Protocol I requires attacking parties to issue an effective 
advance warning ―of attacks which may affect the civilian 
population, unless circumstances do not permit.‖88 
At the same time, it is important to note that, as in other areas, 
LOAC is at its foundation concerned with practicalities.  The 
obligation is to take precautions that are feasible in the 
circumstances, given the information available to the commanders 
and military planners.  The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission 
explained that, ―[b]y ‗feasible,‘ Article 57 means those measures 
that are practicable or practically possible, taking into account all 
circumstances ruling at the time.‖89  Precautions cannot be judged 
by whether a certain result was obtained after the fact;90 
 
85 Jean-François Quéguiner, Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct 
of Hostilities, 88 INT‘L REV. RED CROSS 793, 801 (2006) (noting that this angle of 
attack ―also means that damage would tend to be in the middle of the bridge and 
thus easier to repair‖) (citing Michael W. Lewis, The Law of Aerial Bombardment in 
the 1991 Gulf War, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 481, 501 (2003)). 
86 AP I, supra note 27, art. 57(3). 
87 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii) and art. 57(2)(b). 
88 Id. art. 57(2)(c). 
89 Ethiopia v. Eritrea, Partial Award—Western & Eastern Fronts, Ethiopia‘s 
Claims 1 & 3, ¶ 33 (Eri. Eth. Claims Comm‘n, 2005), available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/FINAL%20ET%20FRONT%20CLAIMS(1).pdf. 
90 Rather, the language of both provisions, speaking of attacks that ―may 
affect‖ the civilian population in AP I, supra note 27, art. 57(2)(c), and accounting 
for ―circumstances‖ or events within the commander‘s ―power,‖ in Hague IV, 
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nonetheless, they do demand that parties gather, analyze, and act 
on all relevant information in the planning process.  The ability of 
drones to loiter over a target and gather information greatly 
increases the time during which a target can be analyzed and 
verified, in most cases significantly improving the accuracy of 
attacks. 
Distinction and proportionality considerations do not generally 
turn on the choice of an armed UAV rather than a missile fired 
from a piloted aircraft.  The actual choice of weapon or weapons 
system, however, is a component of the obligation to take 
precautions.91  Means and methods of warfare must be chosen with 
an eye to minimizing or even avoiding civilian casualties. 
Here a drone must be used when reasonably available and 
its use is operationally feasible, but only if such use would 
minimize likely collateral damage without sacrificing 
military advantage.  Conversely, drones may not be used 
when other means or methods of warfare that would result 
in less collateral damage with an equivalent prospect of 
mission success are available.92 
The legal issue concerns what amount of information constitutes 
sufficient available information for an acceptable determination 
regarding precautions and proportionality.  As the ICTY stated, the 
question is ―whether a reasonably well-informed person in the 
circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of 
the information available to him or her, could have expected 
excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.‖93  In an age 
when the information-gathering capabilities of drones make 
extraordinary amounts of information available, it is reasonable to 
examine whether using drones adds any heightened standard for 
the use of information in analyzing targets, potential collateral 
damage and other considerations.  The new ―persistent 
 
supra note 45, art. 26, leads to the conclusion that the law focuses on the content 
and nature of the warnings at the time and whether they were reasonable and 
effective under the circumstances. 
91 See PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 43, at 682 [¶ 2200] (noting that 
although the rule itself does not imply a prohibition of specific weapons, ―their 
precision and range should be taken into account . . . .‖). 
92 Schmitt, supra note 20, at 325. 
93 Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 58 
(Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003). 
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surveillance‖ capabilities of drones, including ―network-centric 
access to related ISR data throughout the command structure, the 
improving quality and types of information collected by virtual 
platforms (especially real-time data), and the complete lack of risk 
involved in the collection of information‖94 are continually 
reshaping these questions.  Some therefore argue that the 
obligation to take all feasible precautions extends beyond analysis 
of information gathered on-scene to include ―assessment[s] of the 
key methods, procedures, and systems necessary to support the 
effective use of the virtual technologies to be deployed, including a 
careful evaluation of whether appropriate efforts are being made to 
ensure that databases are sufficiently accurate to catch mistakes by 
the human operators.‖95 
In all three areas—distinction, proportionality, and 
precautions—drones‘ unique and advanced capabilities suggest 
great potential for adherence to LOAC‘s obligations.  Drones are 
not automatons; they depend on human operators, analysts, and 
decisionmakers.  As a result, the use of armed drones in 
compliance with the law also depends on these same categories of 
human participants.  Some critics challenge the growing use of 
armed drones, arguing that remote operators are desensitized to 
the effects of combat and risk approaching targeting—and 
killing—as a video game rather than a war with real life-and-death 
consequences.96  In the same vein, such detractors raise concerns 
that because drones ―make it easier to kill without risk to a State‘s 
forces, policy makers and commanders will be tempted to interpret 
the legal limitations on who can be killed, and under what 
circumstances, too expansively.‖97  These concerns are certainly 
legitimate, but perhaps a bit unfounded.  Pilots who have flown 
both fighter jets and drones explain that while the F-16 pilot 
 
94 Beard, supra note 26, at 435, n. 139 (citing Michael N. Schmitt, Precision 
Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 Int‘l Rev. Red Cross 445, 461 (2005)). 
95 Id. at 441. 
96 See David E. Anderson, Drones and the Ethics of War, RELIGION & ETHICS 
NEWSWEEKLY (May 14, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics 
/episodes/by-topic/international/drones-and-the-ethics-of-war/6290/ (citing 
one critic of drone strikes who argues that ―[T}he real ethical issue . . . is ‗the 
greater propensity to kill‘ made possible by the ‗video game-like‘ quality of drone 
combat.‖). 
97 Alston Report, supra note 25, ¶ 80. 
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engages the target and then returns to the base, drones, in contrast, 
are intimately connected to the battlefield, the target and the 
aftermath of the attack.  ―The amount of time spent surveilling an 
area—sometimes hundreds of hours are devoted to a single 
mission—creates a greater sense of intimacy than with other 
aircraft,‖98 debunking the myth of the ―Playstation mentality.‖  As 
one UAV commander explains, 
―There‘s no detachment. . . . Those employing the system 
are very involved at a personal level in combat.  You hear 
the AK-47 going off, the intensity of the voice on the radio 
calling for help.  You‘re looking at him, 18 inches away 
from him, trying everything in your capability to get that 
person out of trouble.‖99 
In addition, the UAV will remain over the attack site and go 
from launching an attack into a battle damage assessment 
immediately thereafter.100  UAV pilots and sensor operators have 
significantly greater engagement with the battlefield and the 
destruction of war than other pilots.  In the end, though, it is 
compliance with the law that matters to ensure protection for 
civilians and others under LOAC, not the moral or mental 
motivation of the attacker in fulfilling the obligations of distinction, 
proportionality, and precautions. 
2. THE IMPACT OF DRONES ON TRADITIONAL  
LOAC CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS 
The increased use of armed drones over the past decade, both 
in armed conflict and in counterterrorism operations outside of 
armed conflict, has also played a major role in introducing some 
questions regarding the application of traditional LOAC concepts 
and categories to today‘s conflicts and situations.  As the media 
have reported extensively, U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan are 
generally planned and executed by intelligence agencies and 
 
98 Megan McCloskey, The War Room: Daily Transition between Battle, Home 
Takes a Toll on Drone Operators, STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 27, 2009), 
http://www.stripes.com/news/the-war-room-daily-transition-between-battle-
home-takes-a-toll-on-drone-operators-1.95949. 
99 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
100 See Blanchard, supra note 12 (explaining in detail the U.S. Air Force‘s 
process of drone targeting and acquisition). 
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operatives, rather than the military.101  In some cases, contractors 
play a significant role in the operation of the drones as well, often 
at the launch and recovery sites overseas.102  The involvement of 
non-military personnel, whether intelligence operatives or 
contractors, can have consequences for the application of LOAC to 
such persons during armed conflict.  Another challenging issue 
involves the geographical parameters of the battlefield.  The ability 
to use armed drones across state borders without risk to personnel 
who could be shot down or captured across those borders could 
have an expansive effect on the location of conflict and hostilities, 
in essence broadening the battlefield beyond traditional 
parameters.  Finally, extensive media coverage of the psychological 
and emotional impact of the UAV campaigns, particularly in 
northwest Pakistan, raises questions about whether there are 
second-order effects from the UAV strikes beyond the fundamental 
questions of applying LOAC principles to the actual targeting and 
strikes. 
2.1. Status of Operators and Direct Participation 
LOAC is relevant not only in analyzing the lawfulness of 
particular attacks, but also in determining the rights and privileges 
of persons involved in the operation and targeting of drones.  In 
international armed conflict, LOAC recognizes two categories:  
combatants and civilians.103  This status, whether on the battlefield 
or off, determines whether a person can lawfully engage in 
hostilities, is immune from attack, and enjoys the privileges of 
prisoner of war status upon capture, among other questions.  In 
non-international armed conflict, LOAC does not contemplate 
combatant status and leaves classification of persons to the state‘s 
 
101 See, e.g., Scott Shane, C.I.A. Drone Use is Set to Expand Inside Pakistan, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009, at A1 (noting the C.I.A.‘s increased use of remote missiles and 
aircraft to target al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their allies); Craig Whitlock & Greg 
Miller, U.S. Creating a Ring of Secret Drone Bases, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2011, at A1 
(describing the Obama administration‘s construction of drone bases to combat al-
Qaeda and its allies in Somalia and Yemen). 
102 See James Risen & Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Said to Use Outsiders to Put Bombs 
on Drones, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009, at A1 (describing how the Xe company, 
formerly known as Blackwater, has assumed an important role in the U.S. 
military‘s anti-terrorism drone operations). 
103 See GC III, supra note 27, art. 4 (defining prisoners of war); AP I, supra note 
27, art. 50 (defining civilians and civilian populations). 
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domestic law.104  This distinction raises two questions:  who has a 
legal right to launch attacks using armed drones, and what are the 
consequences for those who do so in the absence of such legal 
authority? 
For the purposes of the instant discussion, the first key 
difference between combatants and other persons during armed 
conflict is that combatants are entitled to engage in hostilities—
lawful belligerents do not commit crimes when they engage in 
lawful killing or destruction of property in the course of 
hostilities.105  Thus, a soldier who kills the enemy in accordance 
with the law of war—the person killed was a legitimate target, the 
attack complied with basic LOAC principles, and so forth—is not 
engaging in what would, under domestic law, be murder.  In this 
way, the law effectively permits acts that would be criminal during 
peacetime, reflecting the fact that soldiers act as agents of the 
sovereign state.106  Persons who do not qualify for combatant 
status, in contrast, can be prosecuted for acts on the battlefield 
under domestic law, because they do not enjoy the privilege of 
combatant immunity.107 
As members of the regular armed forces of a state, military 
personnel who operate drones are combatants and therefore do not 
pose any questions regarding the authority to use lethal force in 
the course of armed conflict.  U.S. drone strikes in Afghanistan, or 
Israeli drone strikes against Palestinian militants108 in the course of 
that armed conflict, do not raise questions regarding status and 
 
104 See ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 259 (2008) (―[T]here is no prisoner of 
war status under NIAC.  The state where the non-international armed conflict 
takes place can treat the rebels as simple criminals and try them for having taken 
up the arms against the government, contrary to the criminal law of that state.‖). 
105 See, e.g., United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp.2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002) 
(holding that an American who fought for the Taliban was not a lawful 
combatant, and therefore was not entitled to combatant immunity under GC III). 
106 See, e.g., LIEBER CODE, supra note 31, art. 57 (―So soon as a man is armed by 
a sovereign government and takes the soldier‘s oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; 
his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual crimes or 
offenses.‖). 
107 See, e.g., Lindh, 212 F. Supp.2d 541 (concluding that Lindh was not a lawful 
combatant and was therefore not entitled to combatant immunity). 
108 Although news reports talk of Israeli drone strikes, Israeli officials 
generally maintain that drones are used only for reconnaissance and targeting 
planning. 
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combatants‘ privilege, therefore.  In contrast, it is widely reported 
that the CIA is the lead—perhaps sole—agency planning and 
executing U.S. targeted strikes using armed drones in Pakistan.109  
Neither intelligence agents nor contractors fall within the category 
of combatant under LOAC.  They are not members of regular 
armed forces, civilians engaged in a levée en masse, or members of a 
regular militia under responsible command, carrying arms openly, 
wearing a distinctive emblem, and abiding by the laws of war.110  
As a result, they do not enjoy the right to engage in hostilities 
within the law of war and the concomitant immunity that 
accompanies that right—combatant immunity.  A person who 
engages in hostilities without combatant status does not violate 
LOAC per se, but does not enjoy the protection from prosecution 
that combatant status provides.111  Thus, CIA agents or contractors 
who launch UAV attacks can be subject to prosecution under the 
domestic law of the countries where the attacks occur and would 
not be protected by the LOAC principle of combatant immunity.112 
A second, and closely related, issue that arises from non-
military personnel operating armed drones during armed conflict 
is that such personnel can be liable to attack as a result of their 
 
109 The extent of the hostilities between the United States and militants in 
Pakistan, including Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other groups, suggests 
that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict in Pakistan.  See Laurie R. 
Blank & Benjamin R. Farley, Characterizing U.S. Operations in Pakistan: Is the United 
States Engaged in an Armed Conflict?, 34 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 151, 151–52 (2011) 
(considering whether the United States‘ involvement in Pakistan is an armed 
conflict).  In Yemen and Somalia, however, where the United States has also 
employed UAV strikes against terrorist operatives, the United States is operating 
within the international law of self-defense and is not engaged in an armed 
conflict at this time, making the legal analysis, particularly regarding the status 
and rights of persons, wholly different. 
110 See GC III, supra note 27 (setting forth the categories of individuals entitled 
to combatant status). 
111 See Lindh, 212 F. Supp.2d 557–58 (noting that persons who engage in 
hostilities without lawful combatant status do not have immunity from 
prosecution under domestic law). 
112 See Nathan Hodge, Drone Pilots Could Be Tried for “War Crimes,” Law Prof 
Says, WIRED.COM (Apr. 28, 2010, 4:15 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom 
/2010/04/drone-pilots-could-be-tried-for-war-crimes-law-prof-says/ (describing 
how drone operators could be prosecuted in the country in which they carried out 
the drone-related actions because these operators ―[are not] combatants in a legal 
sense.‖). 
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participation in hostilities.113  One of the central tenets of LOAC is 
that civilians are immune from attack.  Article 51(2) of Additional 
Protocol I states:  ―The civilian population as such, as well as 
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.‖114  Direct 
targeting of civilians is therefore strictly prohibited.  But the 
protection for civilians is significantly broader than protection 
from direct attack.  Article 51 sets the foundation for a framework 
of protections to ensure that ―the civilian population and 
individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers 
arising from military operations.‖115 
However, the practical and functional needs of the law lead to 
one important exception:  direct participation in hostilities.  Article 
51(3) of Additional Protocol I sets forth this exception, stating that 
―[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, 
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.‖116  
In certain limited circumstances, therefore, civilians may be 
directly and intentionally targeted during hostilities, 
notwithstanding their civilian status.  As the Israeli Supreme Court 
held in its 2006 Targeted Killings judgment, 
A civilian who violates that law and commits acts of 
combat does not lose his status as a civilian, but as long as 
he is taking a direct part in hostilities he does not enjoy—
during that time—the protection granted to a civilian.  He is 
subject to the risks of attack like those to which a combatant 
is subject, without enjoying the rights of a combatant, e.g. 
those granted to a prisoner of war.  True, his status is that 
of a civilian, and he does not lose that status while he is 
directly participating in hostilities.  However, he is a 
civilian performing the function of a combatant.  As long as 
he performs that function, he is subject to the risks which 
 
113 See AP I, supra note 27, art. 51(3) (―Civilians shall enjoy the protection 
afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities.‖). 
114 Id. art. 51(2). 
115 Id. art. 51(1). 
116 Id. art. 51(3). 
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that function entails and ceases to enjoy the protection 
granted to a civilian from attack.117 
From a practical standpoint, enabling civilians to engage in 
hostilities but maintain their immunity from attack would upend 
LOAC‘s delicate balance between military necessity and 
humanity.118  Direct participation thus also comports with the basic 
right of individual self-defense by recognizing that a soldier 
engaged in conflict has the right to respond with force to someone 
posing a threat, whether that person is a combatant or a civilian. 
Although the parameters and definition of direct participation 
in hostilities has been the subject of extensive debate, the nature of 
the activities that intelligence operatives and contractors engage in 
as part of UAV attacks fall squarely within the context of direct 
participation in hostilities.119  Therefore, such persons lose their 
 
117 See Targeted Killings Case, 57(6) IsrSC 285, ¶ 31, available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf; see also 
Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., Report No. 55/97, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 178 (1998) (―Specifically, when civilians, such as 
those who attacked the Tablada base, assume the role of combatants by directly 
taking part in fighting, whether singly or as a member of a group, they thereby 
become legitimate military targets.  As such, they are subject to direct 
individualized attack to the same extent as combatants.‖) (emphasis omitted). 
118 See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International 
Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT‘L L. 795, 803 (2010) 
(explaining the interplay between necessity and distinction). 
119 See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgement, ¶ 177 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008) 
(listing the following examples of direct participation in hostilities: ―bearing, 
using or taking up arms, taking part in military or hostile acts, activities, conduct 
or operations, armed fighting or combat, participating in attacks against enemy 
personnel, property or equipment, transmitting military information for the 
immediate use of a belligerent, transporting weapons in proximity to combat 
operations, and serving as guards, intelligence agents, lookouts, or observers on 
behalf of military forces‖) (citations omitted); MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THE JOINT 
SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 2004, JSP 383, at § 5.3.3 (U.K.) 
[hereinafter U.K. MANUAL] (including amongst ―those taking a direct part in 
hostilities . . . [c]ivilians manning an anti-aircraft gun or engaging in sabotage of 
military installations‖); U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 
1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER‘S HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, § 8.2.2 (2007) (―Direct participation in hostilities 
must be judged on a case-by-case basis.  Some examples include taking up arms 
or otherwise trying to kill, injure, or capture enemy personnel or destroy enemy 
property.‖).  See also Interpretive Guidance, supra note 65, at 991 (noting that the 
conduct of hostilities falls within the definition of direct participation in 
hostilities). 
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immunity from attack and can be targeted during armed conflict.  
Direct participation in hostilities is not, in and of itself, a violation 
of LOAC, however, and any civilians who engage in drone strikes 
are not liable for violations of LOAC unless they launch those 
attacks in violation of the law—such as deliberate targeting of 
civilians, disproportionate or indiscriminate attacks, or a failure to 
take precautions, for example.120  In the context of who operates 
drones and launches or participates in attacks, the growing use of 
armed drones does pose interesting questions regarding status and 
the consequences of that status, with regard to the loss of both 
immunity from attack and immunity from prosecution.  
2.2. Geography of Attacks 
Even a cursory reading of the front-page news from the past 
several years demonstrates an expanding geography of UAV 
attacks:  Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya.  Some 
of these, such as in Afghanistan—and now Pakistan—and Libya, 
fall within the generally recognized parameters of an armed 
conflict.  Others, such as Yemen and Somalia, raise more 
complicated questions regarding where force is being used and 
what that means for the application of LOAC.  A secondary part of 
this inquiry is the difficulty of determining which groups form part 
of the enemy in this armed conflict and which groups are separate 
entities. 
Some argue that the use of armed drones is extending the 
battlefield to locales wherever UAV attacks against terrorist 
operatives take place.121  Indeed, the United States has used drones 
extensively beyond the existing conflict regions of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.  In the first targeted killing after September 11, a CIA 
 
120 See Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat‟l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Gov‟t Reform, 111th Cong. 27 (2010) (statement of David W. Glazier, 
Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles) (also arguing, however, that 
under the legal theories adopted by our government in prosecuting Guantánamo 
detainees, these CIA officers, as well as any higher level government officials who 
have authorized or directed their attacks, are committing war crimes). 
121 See Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Nat‟l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Gov‟t Reform, 111th Cong. 20 (2010) (statement of Mary Ellen 
O‘Connell, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame) (arguing for strict rules 
limiting the use of armed drones to legally determinable combat zones.).  
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drone launched a Hellfire missile into southern Yemen, killing six 
suspected al Qaeda members, including the man believed to be 
responsible for the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole.122  More recently, 
the United States used a drone strike to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, the 
Muslim cleric who served as an operational commander of al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), who was suspected of 
planning the failed attack against Britain‘s ambassador to Yemen 
in April 2010, and who was allegedly involved in the Fort Hood 
massacre of November 2009 and the attempted airline bombing on 
Christmas Day 2009.123  In Somalia, as early as January 2007, the 
United States launched attacks against al Qaeda members 
suspected of involvement in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania.124  After multiple failed drone strikes 
against Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, the al Qaeda militant suspected of 
masterminding the 2002 attack on the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, 
Kenya, the U.S. launched a commando raid in broad daylight, 
killing Nabhan and at least eight others.125  And in June 2011, the 
United States used an armed UAV to attack two senior members of 
al-Shabab who had direct ties to al-Awlaki.126 
 
122 See Sources: U.S. Kills Cole Suspect, CNN.COM, Nov. 5, 2002, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/11/04/yemen.blast/index.html 
(detailing how a CIA drone killed a terrorist bombing suspect).  See also Alston 
Report, supra note 25, ¶ 7 (noting the reported November 2002 attack in Yemen by 
a CIA-operated drone). 
123 See Con Coughlin & Philip Sherwell, American Drones Deployed to Target 
Yemeni Terrorist, TELEGRAPH, MAY 2, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk 
/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/7663661/American-drones-deployed-to-
target-Yemeni-terrorist.html (detailing President Obama‘s authorization of the 
assassination of al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, because of the radicalizing effect of his 
sermons in addition to his operational role in AQAP). 
124 See US „Targets al-Qaeda‟ in Somalia, BBC NEWS, Jan. 9, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6245943.stm (discussing U.S. air strikes 
carried out in Somalia that killed at least nineteen people, and the concerns 
expressed by Italy and the UN regarding the practical consequences of the U.S. 
attacks). 
125 See Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, American Raid in Somalia Kills Qaeda 
Militant, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 15, 2009, at A1 (describing the helicopter attack on a 
convoy carrying Nabhan and the leaders of Shabab, an Islamist group with ties to 
al Qaeda that is fighting to overthrow Somalia‘s recognized government); Jeffrey 
Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Forces Fire Missiles Into Somalia at a Kenyan, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at A9 (describing a prior failed attempt to assassinate Nabhan 
using Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from a submarine in the Arabian Sea).  
126 See Greg Jaffe & Karen DeYoung, U.S. Drone Targets Two Leaders of Somali 
Group Allied with Al Qaeda, Official Says, WASH. POST, June 29, 2011, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/us-drones-target-
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In response to the growing use of drones, some suggest that it 
is ―easier‖ to send unmanned aircraft across sovereign borders 
because there is no risk of a pilot being shot down and captured, 
making the escalation and spillover of conflict more likely.127  
Similarly, one might argue that it is easier to group more entities or 
individuals within the category of ―enemy‖ because of the greater 
ease in reaching them with drones.128  An armed drone is simply a 
weapon, much like any other, and a weapon does not drive the 
legal interpretation of what constitutes armed conflict and against 
whom the conflict is being fought.  To the extent that one country 
engages in extensive UAV strikes against another state—creating 
an international armed conflict—or against a non-state actor so as 
to create a situation of protracted armed violence,129 then what was 
an isolated UAV campaign against selected targets could morph 
into an armed conflict.130  In the contemporary arena of a conflict 
between states and non-state terrorist groups, the more complex 
questions involve the consequences of UAV strikes for the 
parameters of that conflict against terrorist groups—the extension 
of an existing and admittedly hard-to-define conflict instead of the 
creation of new conflicts. 
The present conflict between the United States and al Qaeda 
and affiliated terrorist groups poses significant, yet seemingly 
fundamental, questions about not only the law applicable to 
 
two-leaders-of-somali-group-allied-with-al-qaeda/2011/06/29 
/AGJFxZrH_story.html (discussing U.S. drone attacks in Somalia against al-
Shabab.). 
127 See O‘Connell, supra note 23 (presenting evidence that the availability of 
unmanned combat vehicles (UCVs) is lowering psychological and political 
barriers to killing).  
128 See, e.g., Robert Chesney, Is AQAP Part-and-Parcel of al Qaeda? Some New 
Evidence, LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 28, 2011, 2:56 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com 
/2011/08/is-aqap-part-and-parcel-of-al-qaeda-some-new-evidence/ (discussing 
whether AQAP‘s request for Bin Laden‘s permission to install Anwar al-Awlaki 
as AQAP‘s leader demonstrates that AQAP is ―part-and-parcel of ‗core‘ al Qaeda‖ 
for purposes of status under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)). 
129 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (defining armed conflict as ―protracted armed violence 
between . . . governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a State‖). 
130 See Blank & Farley, supra note 109, at 188–89 (characterizing the United 
States‘ engagement in Pakistan, including the use of unmanned drones, as an 
armed conflict). 
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operations against terrorists, but also about where the conflict is 
taking place and where that law applies.  Beyond the obvious areas 
of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the border areas of Pakistan, there is, at 
present, little agreement on where the battlefield is—that is, where 
this conflict is taking place—and an equal measure of uncertainty 
regarding when it started and how it might end.  In traditional 
conflicts, military operations could take place beyond the territory 
of any neutral party.131  The law of neutrality generally ―defines the 
relationship under international law between states engaged in an 
armed conflict and those that are not participating in that 
conflict.‖132  Neutrality law thus led to a geographic-based 
framework in which belligerents can fight on belligerent territory 
or the commons, but must refrain from any operations on neutral 
territory.  In essence, the battlespace in a traditional armed conflict 
between two or more states is anywhere outside the sovereign 
territory of any of the neutral states.133 
Today‘s conflicts, however, pit states against non-state actors.  
The latter are actors and groups who often do not have any 
territorial nexus beyond wherever they can find safe haven free 
from government intrusion.  Once we are outside the belligerent-
neutral framework that defined the traditional battlespace, 
determining the parameters of the contemporary battlefield or 
zone of combat becomes significantly more complicated.  Simply 
superimposing the approach applicable in traditional armed 
conflict onto conflicts with terrorist groups does not provide any 
means for distinguishing between different conceptions of the 
battlefield.  In the past several years, arguments have centered on 
whether there can be a global battlefield or whether the conflict 
with al Qaeda is limited solely to Afghanistan.134  Just a few weeks 
 
131 See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 20 (4th ed. 2005) 
(―In principle, all the territories of the belligerent States, anywhere under their 
sovereign sway, are inside the region of war.  As a corollary, the region of war 
does not overstep the boundaries of neutral States, and no hostilities are permitted 
within their respective domains.‖). 
132 U.K. Manual, supra note 119, § 1.42. 
133 See DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 26 (―[T]he region of war does not include 
the territories of neutral States, and no hostilities are permissible within neutral 
boundaries.‖). 
134 See Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and 
Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat, 39 GA. J. INT‘L 
& COMP. L. 1, 20–21 (2010) (arguing for the use of factors drawn from LOAC in 
analyzing the parameters of the battlefield in contemporary conflicts). 
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after the September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush laid 
the foundation for the notion of the whole world as a battlefield 
when he pronounced that ―our war on terror will be much broader 
than the battlefields and beachheads of the past.  This war will be 
fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan.‖135  When coupled 
with statements by other high-ranking administration officials,136 
the President‘s view of a global battlefield, in which the whole 
world is a war zone, became clear.  The Obama Administration has 
not used the same language of a global battlefield, but has actually 
significantly expanded the use of drone strikes outside of 
Afghanistan.137  The use of armed drones against terrorist 
operatives in Yemen and Somalia has driven debate about whether 
those areas fall within the boundaries of the armed conflict with al 
Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups, whether any hostilities in 
those areas constitute separate armed conflicts, or whether the 
conflict against terrorists can indeed be a global one.138  To this 
extent, the use of armed drones continues to generate extensive 
discussion about where conflict against transnational non-state 
actors occurs. 
 
135 President George W. Bush, Radio Address of the President to the Nation, 
(Sep. 29, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov 
/news/releases/2001/09/20010929.html.  
136 See, e.g., Interview by Tony Snow with Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice 
in D.C. (Nov. 10, 2002), http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly 
_story/0,3566,69783,00.html.  Secretary Rice explained, ―We‘re in a new kind of 
war, and we‘ve made very clear that it is important that this new kind of war be 
fought on different battlefields.‖  Id.  See also Matthew C. Waxman, The Structure of 
Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20 DUKE J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 431, 444 (2010) 
(noting that this view ―extend[s] the boundaries of the conflict to take in al-
Qaeda‘s operations around the world‖) (quoting Anthony Dworkin, Beyond the 
War on Terror: Towards a New Transatlantic Framework for Counterterrorism, 13 EUR. 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 1, 5 (2009)). 
137 See Larisa Epatko, Controversy Surrounds Increased Use of U.S. Drone Strikes, 
THE RUNDOWN, PBS NEWSHOUR, Oct. 10, 2011, http://www.pbs.org/newshour 
/rundown/2011/10/drone-strikes-1.html (describing the exponential increase in 
the use of drones under the Obama Administration and the accompanying 
increase in civilian deaths). 
138 See generally, Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case 
Study in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT‘L 
HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 3–6 (2010).  See also Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made 
Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at A1 (discussing the legal 
analysis allegedly conducted by the Obama Administration to determine the 
lawfulness of killing Anwar al-Awlaki, and American citizen, on Yemen soil). 
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2.3. Contemporary Challenges for Proportionality and Precautions 
Drones do introduce additional interesting considerations into 
the proportionality and precautions calculus as well.  The very 
capabilities that make drones an effective weapon with regard to 
distinction, proportionality, and precautions can also have the 
effect of actually changing the calculus for assessing a lawful 
attack.  In essence, drones may ―raise[] the bar of expectations,‖ 
creating a higher standard because of the ability to target more 
precisely.139  A significant part of any analysis of the legality of an 
attack relies on the notion of the ―reasonable commander‖ looking 
at the situation from the perspective of the commander before the 
attack.  If drone capabilities alter what a reasonable commander 
knows—or is expected to know—then we may see a shift in the 
actual content of how distinction, proportionality, and precautions 
are being interpreted in operations and after-the-fact.  At first 
glance, this shift can have positive effects:  as parties continue to be 
more precise and more demanding in their implementation of 
LOAC, the ability to protect civilians will also increase.  However, 
such heightened standards can raise serious concerns.  If using 
drones means that a party faces different legal standards and 
obligations than it would in the absence of drones, that party may 
opt for a less precise weapon in order to avoid such heightened 
standards.  Here, civilians will likely bear the brunt of such 
decisions, meaning that, overall, the use of drones in a way that 
maximizes—but does not significantly alter—adherence to the 
obligations of distinction, proportionality, and precautions is the 
best way to carry out LOAC‘s central goals.  
Second, as news reports have documented, the sheer volume 
and pace of the information gathered by drones can be 
overwhelming, sometimes to the point of detracting from efficient 
military operations and decisionmaking.140  In 2009, ―Air Force 
drones collected nearly three times as much video over 
 
139 See Christopher Drew, Human Rights Group Says 29 Civilians Were Killed by 
Israeli Air Attacks in Gaza, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/world/middleeast/01gaza.html (quoting 
P.W. Singer, author of Wired for War). 
140 See Christopher Drew, Military Is Awash in Data from Drones, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 10, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/business 
/11drone.html?pagewanted=all (highlighting the challenges posed by excessive 
information from drones). 
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Afghanistan and Iraq . . . as in 2007‖ and are on course to increase 
that yield exponentially.141  Reaper drones, the latest development 
in drones, will soon be able to record video in over thirty directions 
at once.142  The flood of information raises concerns about the 
ability of analysts to cull the essential information for operational 
decisionmaking, particularly in time-sensitive situations.  For 
example, investigations into a February 2010 attack in Afghanistan 
suggested that information overload was responsible for the 
mistaken targeting of civilians, including children.  In the 
intelligence gathered from a UAV video feed and other sources: 
There were solid reports that the group included children, 
but the team did not adequately focus on them amid the 
swirl of data . . . . The team was under intense pressure to 
protect American forces nearby, and in the end it 
determined, incorrectly, that the villagers‘ convoy posed an 
imminent threat, resulting in one of the worst losses of 
civilian lives in the war in Afghanistan.143 
Although the data that drones can gather is a critical tool for 
effective proportionality analyses and contributes greatly to 
LOAC-compliant targeting, it is important to recognize the limits 
of data analysis as well.  As one U.S. military commander explains, 
―You need somebody who‘s trained and is accountable in 
recognizing that that is a woman, that is a child and that is 
someone who‘s carrying a weapon . . . [a]nd the best tools for that 
are still the eyeball and the human brain.‖144  Furthermore, given 
that proportionality rests on a reasonable commander‘s 
determination based on the information available to him at the 
time of the attack, we must consider whether drones at some point 
will no longer add to that process but could actually impede that 
process simply because of the flood of information. 
A final development to consider regarding drones and 
proportionality is whether the use of armed drones and their 
heightened capabilities is altering the interpretation—and thus 
 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Thom Shanker & Matt Richtel, In New Military, Data Overload Can Be 
Deadly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2011/01/17/technology/17brain.html?pagewanted=all. 
144 Drew, Military is Awash, supra note 140. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss3/2
02 BLANK (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2012  5:40 PM 
2012] AFTER TOP GUN 715 
implementation—of the principle of proportionality altogether.  As 
noted above, proportionality requires that civilian casualties not be 
excessive; it does not require that there be no civilian casualties at 
all.  The combination of counterinsurgency strategy and UAV 
capabilities in Afghanistan has led to a growing perception that 
any civilian deaths are unlawful.  Strategic policy and mission 
imperatives may well seek to eliminate civilian casualties as much 
as possible, particularly in counterinsurgency, and drones offer 
highly precise targeting capabilities.  The confluence of these two 
factors has often seemed to suggest that proportionality in the 
context of UAV strikes is being, or could soon be, reconfigured, 
that we are seeing a recalibration of the relationship between 
military advantage and civilian casualties—away from ―excessive‖ 
and towards ―none.‖  In essence, if the notion of ―information 
reasonably available to the commander‖ becomes ―perfect 
information,‖ then we would begin to see a trend away from the 
concept of proportionality as we now know it and toward a more 
strict liability standard of targeting analysis in which ―zero 
casualties‖ is the standard.145  Beyond the fact that a zero casualty 
rate is impossible unless all persons in the combat zone are 
considered to be legitimate targets (an extraordinarily dangerous 
conclusion), this change in the proportionality standard raises 
significant concerns.146  In particular, a military force held to such a 
zero casualty standard will either disregard the law entirely as 
unreasonable or will refrain from military operations altogether to 
avoid legal violations.  Both options leave innocent civilians—
LOAC‘s true constituency—unprotected and in danger. 
3. CONCLUSION 
The novelty and hi-tech nature of unmanned aircraft launching 
missiles at targets without risk of retaliation has led to extensive 
moral, philosophical, political, strategic, and legal debates 
 
145 See, e.g., Shane, supra note 10, at A11 (quoting Obama‘s top counter-
terrorism advisor, John O. Brennan, as claiming a zero casualty rate in Pakistan: 
―there hasn‘t been a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, 
precision of the capabilities we‘ve been able to develop‖). 
146 See Laurie R. Blank, Drone Strike Casualties and the Laws of War, JURIST (Aug. 
22, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/08/laurie-blank-drone-strikes.php 
(contending that the CIA‘s claim of zero civilian casualties raises potential serious 
legal and policy questions about drone strikes). 
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regarding the use of such weapons.147  Lauded as highly precise 
and discriminating weapons, decried as ―killer robots,‖148 drones 
are at the center of contentious debates about the moral and ethical 
underpinnings of conflict.  These debates go beyond their direct 
effects—namely, civilian casualties in the course of attacks against 
terrorist targets—to questions about the psychological effects on 
the civilian population living with drones buzzing overhead and 
launching missiles seemingly without warning.149  From a legal 
perspective, drones offer a useful lens through which to view both 
traditional LOAC principles and questions specifically raised in 
contemporary conflicts.  In particular, they have great potential for 
heightened implementation of the key principles of distinction, 
proportionality and precautions in attack.  As a recent report by 
the U.K. Ministry of Defence explains: 
[T]he greater situational awareness provided by the sensors 
on a persistent unmanned aircraft that observes the 
battlespace for long, uninterrupted, periods . . . enables 
better decision making and more appropriate use of force.  
This is enhanced by the fact that the decision-maker is in 
the relatively stress-free environment of an air-conditioned 
cabin instead of in a fast jet cockpit.150 
Use of armed drones continues to raise serious questions about 
the numbers and nature of civilian casualties, but these questions 
stem primarily from the procedures for selecting targets and 
approving attacks,151 not from the nature and capabilities of drones 
 
147 See generally USING TARGETED KILLING TO FIGHT THE WAR ON TERROR (Claire 
Finkelstein et al. eds., forthcoming 2012). 
148 William Saletan, Predators Need Editors, SLATE (Apr. 25, 2011, 8:08 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2292062. 
149 See Smith, supra note 8 (reporting the psychological toll that repeated 
drone strikes have had on people living in Pakistan‘s tribal regions).  Some might 
suggest that UAV attacks constitute attacks that spread terror among the civilian 
population, in violation of Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I.  However, the 
crime of spreading terror among the civilian population requires specific intent, 
which is not demonstrated in the case of UAV attacks.  See Prosecutor v. Galic, 
Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 162 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (―[T]he crime of terror contains the distinct 
material element of ‗primary purpose of spreading terror.‘‖). 
150 MINISTRY OF DEF., THE UK APPROACH TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS, 
2011, J. Doctrine Note 2/11, ¶ 519. 
151 See supra Part 1.2. 
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themselves.  As with any other weapon, it is essential to ensure 
that UAV attacks are launched only against legitimate military 
objectives in accordance with the obligations of proportionality 
and precautions. 
The nature of today‘s conflicts and the way in which armed 
drones are employed do introduce some concerns about how 
drones and their capabilities are affecting the interpretation, 
implementation, and development of LOAC.  News reports show 
that the U.S. drone program, particularly in Pakistan, involves 
significant civilian participation, which raises questions regarding 
the status and privileges of persons launching attacks.  Drone 
campaigns against al Qaeda and other terrorist operatives beyond 
the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan have contributed 
substantially to questions regarding the geographical parameters 
of armed conflict, particularly conflict with transnational non-state 
actors and the challenges of understanding who is part of an 
enemy group for the purposes of targeting and detention. 
Finally, notwithstanding the extensive capabilities drones offer 
in the areas of distinction, proportionality and precautions, current 
developments demonstrate that drones also pose some potential 
risks to the development and interpretation of the law in ways that 
could endanger the central goal of protecting civilians and 
conducting hostilities in a lawful manner.  Counterinsurgency 
strategy and mission imperatives appropriately seek to eliminate 
civilian casualties as much as possible in the fight for ―hearts and 
minds.‖  But international law does not require no civilian 
casualties; indeed, the law accepts that there will be incidental 
casualties from lawful attacks—a tragic but not criminal 
consequence of war.  The combination of drones‘ highly precise 
targeting capabilities and strategic needs to reduce civilian 
casualties has led to a growing—and mistaken—perception that 
any civilian deaths are unlawful.  It may seem that innocent 
civilians will be the beneficiaries of this development; in fact, the 
opposite could well be true.  To the extent that drones thus begin 
to alter interpretations of distinction, proportionality, and 
precautions, the results may not be as protective for civilians as 
anticipated.  A military force facing such a zero casualty standard 
will either disregard the law entirely as unreasonable, endangering 
civilians in the combat zone, or will refrain from military 
operations altogether to avoid legal violations, leaving its own 
citizens undefended from attacks.  Both options leave innocent 
civilians unprotected and in danger.  As a result, analyzing drones 
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as a weapon and the nature of drone strikes—from target 
acquisition to strike—within existing interpretations of LOAC is 
critical to ensuring and enhancing civilian protections in wartime.  
Maximizing capabilities and effective decisionmaking is the most 
straightforward way to carrying out LOAC‘s key goals and 
principles. 
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